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Abstract 
 
In Sri Lanka, minorities have been facing a number of issues and challenges relating to public administration. When they put 
forward their reasonable demands, those demands are over-communalized by the ethnic majorities, resulting in them to be 
continuously sidetracked. The Kalmunai administrative district demand is an example of such a demand which has been highly 
communalized by recent politics, even though it merely advocates the establishment of an administrative district—an 
intermediate decentralized administrative institution—in order to improve delivery of public service, enhance regional and 
economic development, and facilitate linguistic functions in district administration for those living on the coastal belt of the 
Amparai district. This study examines the extent of the ethnicization and communalization of the Kalmunai administrative 
district demand, by examining in detail the viewpoints taken by the major ethnic groups and their political parties on the 
subject. The findings of this study reveal that although the demand advocated a mere form of decentralization initiative—also 
known as de-concentration—the demand was over-communalized and opposed by other ethnic groups and the political forces 
representing them. They misunderstood the demand to be one calling for political autonomy and separation. This study finds 
that rationalist views of the demand taken by ethnic majorities and major political parties would help to resolve the 
administrative grievances of minorities and achieve the accommodation of the Kalmunai administrative district demand within 
the larger political system in Sri Lanka. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The occurrence of ethnic conflicts and the development of ethnic politics in Sri Lanka have led to the emergence of 
ethnocentric demands within the minority groups. The continued sidetracking of the Tamils’ interests (for example, in 
terms of recognizing their linguistic rights and sharing power within the larger political system) had induced them to 
demand equal rights and political autonomy, subsequently followed by a demand for a separate state for their 
predominant area. Similarly, the domination of political and administrative affairs by the ethnic majorities and the 
continued sidetracking of the interests of the Muslims, particularly in the north-eastern region, induced the Muslims to call 
for more political and administrative autonomy in their predominant areas. The Kalmunai administrative demand is one 
such demand which has been advocated mostly by the Muslim community living on the coastal belt of the Amparai 
district, as a response to the domination by the ethnic majority, the violation of their linguistic rights, and the 
marginalization of their interests in the district administration of Amparai (See: Ibrahim, 2002; Mohideen, 2013 & Sarjoon 
et al., 2015).  
The Kalmunai administrative district demand is a proposal for the government authorities to establish a separate 
administrative district for the coastal area of the present Amparai district as a mechanism to improve public service 
delivery, induce institutional capacity for socio-economic development of the region, and overcome the linguistic issues 
which exist in the district administration. Although the demand emerged on rational grounds and was initially advocated 
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by both the Tamils and the Muslims under the slogan of “Tamil-speakers,” the intense civil war which took place since the 
middle of 1980s led the demand being mostly advocated by the Muslims alone as a solution to resolve a number of 
administrative issues. The other ethnic groups, such as the Tamils and the Sinhalese living within and outside the 
proposed district, continued to view the demand as ethnocentric, criticizing and opposing it on this basis. For the last 
three decades, the demand has received significant ethnic and communal criticisms and oppositions in its process of 
political advocacy. This study seeks to examine why the demand has continuously been opposed on communal lines, 
despite the fact that the establishment of a new administrative district and an administrative machinery— known as the 
District Secretariat—would result in a mere form of decentralized power (i.e., de-concentration) and will not offer political 
autonomy for the Muslims of the region in the Sri Lankan context.  
The main objective of this study is to analyze the extent of the communalization of the demand in its political 
advocacy process. The following section summarizes the materials and methods adopted in this study. Next, a brief look 
at the contents of the Kalmunai administrative district demand and an examination of the communalization of the 
Kalmunai administrative district demand will be made by analyzing the stance taken by the major ethnic groups and the 
major political parties towards the same. The final part of this study examines the truth of the communalization of the 
Kalmunai administrative district demand, and its impact on the advocacy process and the fulfillment of the demand.  
 
2. Research Materials and Methods 
 
This paper is one of the outcomes of a 3-year research project which extensively studied the Kalmunai administrative 
district demand by using the method of case study. Basically, a case study entails a detailed analysis of a single case. 
This study capitalized on two forms of data: primary data and secondary data collected from different sources. In 
gathering primary data related to the case study, several types of sources have been relied upon. These include 
interviews conducted with high level political and administrative officials, in-depth interviews with a number of key 
informants, and focus group discussions. Accordingly, semi-structured interviews with cabinet ministers, 
parliamentarians, former parliamentarians, provincial councilors, and representatives of local government bodies were 
conducted. Further, a series of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were also conducted with key high level 
administrative officials, academicians, educationists, journalists, civil activists, and members of the general public 
(selected from three different ethnic communities living in different parts of the research area) who have shown their 
interest and clear understanding of the core issues surrounding the study, in order to understand the views of each of the 
ethnic groups and major political parties on the subject of the Kalmunai administrative district demand. 
Meanwhile, secondary data were collected from several relevant sources through the method of desk analysis of 
existing literature which were available in the form of academic journal articles and periodicals, thesis and dissertations, 
literary publications (including books from selected public and university libraries and research-based centers), 
newspaper cuttings, government reports, and laws passed by the Sri Lankan parliament. Based on these primary and 
secondary data, the various perspectives of major ethnic groups and political parties towards the Kalmunai administrative 
district demand were analyzed and presented in the form of direct quotations, summaries of interviews and reports, as 
well as interpretive arguments.  
  
3. The Kalmunai Administrative District Demand: A Brief Background 
 
For the last five decades, the people living on the coastal belt of the present Amparai district have been urging the 
government authorities to form a separate administrative district covering the three coastal electorates, namely, 
Kalmunai, Sammanthurai and Pottuvil. The coastal belt of the Amparai district has been considered as a separate region 
in the administration of a number of matters, such as education, healthcare, transportation, irrigation, and 
telecommunication, and has been referred to as “Kalmunai” or the “South-Eastern Region.” The people living in this 
region have been demanding a separate administrative district (referred to as “Kalmunai”) as a mechanism to facilitate 
the functions of public administration, based on the justification that the district administrative machinery—namely, the 
District Secretariat and other government departments—are dominated by the Sinhalese, communicate in Sinhala 
language and are located closer to the Sinhalese predominant settlements, despite the fact that the majority of the 
districts’ population are Tamil-speakers (Muslims and Tamils) who are predominantly living on the coastal belt of the 
district. Tamil-speakers have continuously been discriminated against and marginalized in matters of district 
administration, resource allocation, and development initiatives (Ibrahim, 2002; Sarjoon at el., 2015 & Yusoff et al., 
2015a). This demand has been prevailing at societal and political levels for the last 50 years and has in recent years 
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been a contested topic of discussion and debate in the Muslim as well as in national politics in Sri Lanka.  
The parties and organizations advocating the formation of a Kalmunai administrative district have requested for the 
area covering three coastal electorates of the present Amparai district, namely Sammanthurai, Kalmunai and Puttuvil, to 
be declared as a separate administrative district. Accordingly, the proposed new district would cover an area of 1867.7 
square kilometers, which amounts to about 40 percent of the total land area of the existing Amparai district (See: Ibrahim, 
2002; Jabbar, 2013:83; Mohideen, 2013:51 & Sarjoon et al., 2015). According to Sri Lanka’s 2012 census, the proposed 
district would have a population of 409,260, which is equivalent to 63 percent of the total population of the present 
Amparai district. Out of this, the Muslims constitute 68.60 percent, the Tamils 27.40 percent while the Sinhalese 
constitute only 3.5 percent (Department of Census and Statistics 2014). Although the proposed Kalmunai district 
comprises a predominantly Tamil-speaking population, the district is still an ethnically plural one. Sri Lanka’s major ethnic 
groups—the Sinhalese, the Tamils, and the Muslims—all live in this proposed district. The concentration of Muslims in 
this area has a long history and they also have a long tradition of relations with the other ethnic groups in the region. 
Since the Muslim, Tamil, and Sinhalese settlements are located next to one another, this geographical factor has forced 
them to co-exist and has also strengthened the social and ethnic relations among them (Habullah et al., 2005 & Rameez 
Abdullah, 2005).  
 
4. Kalmunai Administrative District Demand Under Majoritarian Communal Threats: Major Findings 
 
As briefly mentioned at the start of this paper, the demand for an administrative district in the coastal belt of the Amparai 
district was initially welcomed and supported by Tamils and their political and community leaders living within and outside 
the proposed district. However, in due time, they changed their stance and began to criticize and oppose the demand, 
along with the Sinhalese who have always opposed it. Oppositions posed by the other ethnic groups became severe 
when the Muslims started to seriously advocate the demand, especially from 2000 onwards. This study identifies the 
nature and the changing dynamics of the criticisms posed by the other ethnic groups and the political parties 
representing them as being among the major challenges faced in the process of advocating the Kalmunai administrative 
district demand by the Muslim community. The following sub-topics provide an extensive analysis on this subject. 
 
4.1 Opposition and Criticism from Major Ethnic Groups 
 
4.1.1 Opposition and Criticisms from the Sinhalese 
 
Since the Sinhalese have been living a distance away from the settlement of the Tamil-speakers, their interactions with 
the people of the coastal area were limited in the Amparai district. Initially, there was no opposition to the Kalmunai 
district demand from the Sinhalese living in the Amparai area. However, in due time, especially with the intense of ethnic 
conflict and violent civil war, the Sinhalese viewed the demand as being ethnocentric and therefore opposed it. Later, 
they labeled it as a demand threatening the territorial integrity of the country. It is noted that whenever the demand was 
placed on the political negotiation tables by the Muslim political parties and social forces, the Sinhalese political parties 
and nationalist forces mobilized the local masses in the Amparai area to oppose the demand. In this regard, the anti-
demand opposition and the people march staged by the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) in May 2001, with the help of 
many other local political and social forces, serve as among the best examples of this (See: Ibrahim, 2002; Thinakkural, 
2001:1 & Veerakesari, 2001:1).  
The Sinhalese’s opposition to the proposed Kalmunai administrative district emerged mainly from the lack of 
understanding by the Sinhalese political parties, nationalist forces, and their leaders, who misinterpreted the proposal for 
a Muslim-majority administrative district as an attempt to achieve a Muslim-majority political autonomous unit in which 
administration and politics will be highly dominated by the Muslims. In Sri Lankan context, an administrative district 
functions as an intermediate institution in the decentralized administrative machinery and it exercises a mere form of 
decentralized administrative power—de-concentration. There is no room for power politics or representative politics at 
district secretariat. Therefore, this justifies the political motives behind the oppositions expressed by the Sinhalese 
politicians of Amparai to the Kalmunai administrative district demand. Until 1994, Sinhalese politicians have headed the 
District Political Authority (DPA), the District Development Council (DDC), and the District Coordinating Committee (DCC) 
in Amparai district. In this way, they were able to control the District Secretariat. They planned and implemented a 
number of ethnic-oriented development programs which were immensely helpful in uplifting the socio-economic status of 
their (Sinhalese) community. This in turn led to the deprivation and marginalization of the Tamil-speakers in the coastal 
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area (Mohideen 2008; Mohidden 2013 & Sarjoon et al., 2015). The Sinhalese had also benefited in electoral politics from 
the loss of due representation of Tamil-speakers in the district (See: Sarjoon et al., 2015). Therefore, the Sinhalese 
politicians and community began to express their opposition towards the formation of a new district within the district, as 
it would limit the utilization and allocation of resources needed to develop their own areas. Similarly, with the introduction 
of PR electoral system, the Sinhalese benefited politically and this automatically gave them political authority in respect 
of the affairs of district administration. As indicated by IN.01 (Personal communication, 14 July, 2014) and IN.02 
(Personal communication, 22 August, 2014), the Sinhalese have been criticizing and opposing the demand primarily 
because they were not willing to lose their political privileges experiencing in the present Amparai district.  
When the Muslims gained due political representation through the Muslim political party, especially from 1994 
onwards, the Kalmunai administrative district demand correspondingly also gained political importance. It was discussed 
at cabinet meetings and negotiation tables. This further promulgated the idea among the Sinhalese political leaders and 
nationalist forces that if the demand is fulfilled, they would lose their political power and privileges in the district. 
Therefore, whenever negotiations were held on the subject, the Sinhalese politicians mobilized the local public to express 
their protest in various forms of agitation and violence, and by presenting petitions to the central political authority. It is 
noteworthy that most of the oppositions and criticisms put forward by the Sinhalese were mostly developed and 
articulated by the Sinhalese political parties and nationalist forces functioning at the central level, and not at district level.  
In the course of time, at an extreme level, the Sinhalese labelled this demand as a demand to divide the country, 
equating it with the Tamil Tigers’ (LTTE) demand for a separate state. Especially following the end of the civil war with 
the LTTE in May 2009, and with the re-emergence of the Sinhala hegemonic nationalist forces that are voicing to protect 
and promote the Sinhalese-Buddhist ethno-religious aspects while targeting the ethnic minorities, the Kalmunai 
administrative district demand was hugely criticized and was interpreted in various negative forms. As part of an anti-
Muslim discourse, the Sinhalese forces labelled the Kalmunai district demand as being an initial step towards the 
formation of a Muslim state and thereby claimed that the Muslim politicians are challenging the national and territorial 
integrity of the nation. Interestingly, it is noted that during the pre-presidential election in January 2015, the demand 
received strong opposition from the Sinhalese political parties and nationalist forces which had to a certain extent 
supported it in the past. 
As part of this study, a field survey using personal interviews and target group discussions was conducted in 
Sinhalese areas (especially in two villages predominantly inhibited by Sinhalese) in the proposed district. The objective of 
the field survey was to identify the interviewees’ level of understanding of the Kalmunai district demand and to gain some 
insights on their viewpoints on the subject. A majority of the interviewees who participated in the focus group discussions 
displayed negative sentiments regarding the establishment of the proposed district for various reasons. Many of the 
ordinary villagers were not really aware of the demand; hence they did not strongly oppose it. Although some educated 
members of the public and politicians understood the rationale for the formation of a new district, they were against the 
idea of their villages being part of the new district for fear of ethnic domination by the Muslims and ethnic marginalization 
of the Sinhalese under the administration of the new district. They feared that the new district will function in Tamil 
language, which would cause them difficulties and marginalize their interests in the district administration (IN.03-05, 
Personal communications, 17 August, 2014 & 30 August, 2014). Many, especially the local politicians, also expressed 
their dislike for their villages to form part of the new district due to the the opportunistic politics of the Muslim leaders. The 
chairman of the Lahugala local government body (Pradesiya Sabah), the one and only Sinhalese-majority local 
government unit which would come under the proposed district, openly criticized the opportunistic politics practiced by 
the Muslim leaders. According to him, despite the assurances given by the Muslim leaders concerning the safety and 
equal treatment of the Sinhalese in the proposed district administration, the honesty of the Muslim politicians in 
respecting and implementing their assurances is always questionable (IN.06, Personal communication, 17 August, 
2014). Therefore, fear is prevalent among the Sinhalese that if the new district is formed, their villages would be 
marginalized and they would experience discrimination by the district administration. On the other hand, even though a 
few Sinhalese had expressed their supports for the establishment of the new district, they still prefer for their villages to 
be merged and administered together with the neighboring Sinhalese-majority districts, for the sake of administrative 
ease and linguistic convenience.  
From the interviews conducted, another negative viewpoint was discovered among the Sinhalese, especially 
among the government officers and hard-liner, regarding the establishment of the proposed Kalmunai administrative 
district. Many of them justified their oppositions or dislike for the demand on grounds that there is no strong rationale for 
the formation of an administrative district by dividing the existing Amparai district. According to them, Tamil-speakers do 
not face any linguistic problems in accessing the services provided by the District Secretariat. Similarly, they argued that 
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a majority of the public in the district can fulfill their necessary administrative tasks at the local level since most of the 
functions of a District Secretariat have been transferred to Divisional Secretariat (DS) offices by virtue of the 1992 Act. 
Accordingly, a very low percentage of the administrative functions handle by the District Secretariat and therefore, it 
serves as merely as a coordinating and monitoring institution. Further, they argued that there are Tamil-speakers living in 
many Sinhalese-majority districts and Sinhalese-speakers in Tamils-majority districts in other parts of the country, but 
they never made demands for the establishment of a new district for the sake of their administrative ease. They contend 
that dividing the country on an ethnic basis is dangerous as it would challenge the country’s territorial integrity, ethnic 
relations, and societal harmony at the local level (IN.07-09, Personal communications, 30 August, 2014). 
A field visit was conducted at the Amparai District Secretariat building complex to observe the working 
environment of the premises. There were signboards put up in all three official languages. However, no Tamil-speaking 
officer was placed in any major sections at the front office and reception area to respond to any basic inquiries. Although 
there were a few Tamil-speaking officers in each section of the secretariat, the normal routine of the secretariat was 
carried out in the Sinhala language, with most of the Tamil-speaking officers having been placed out of public contact. It 
was also noted that most of the members of the public were normally spoken to in Sinhala language and this caused 
difficulties for most of them. Therefore, a majority of the Tamil-speakers come to the District Secretariat with an 
interpreter or an assistant. Further, many Tamil-speakers have expressed their concerns pertaining to linguistic issues 
and the treatment they received from the officers.  A majority of the ordinary members of the public and interviewees 
involved in the field survey also indicated that the linguistic problems which they face at the District Secretariat is one of 
the root factors motivating them to demand for a separate administrative district, in order to facilitate the needs of Tamil-
speakers in district administration.  
This study has also found that there are no strong reasons to support the Sinhalese’s belief that the demand for a 
new Muslim-majority administrative district equals the formation of an autonomous political unit or a new state for 
Muslims. These criticisms have basically emerged due to the lack of understanding of the Kalmunai district demand and 
the system of district administration in general. In Sri Lanka’s administrative context, a district is an administrative unit 
and the District Secretariat merely facilitates the administrative machinery of the central government through exercising 
the decentralized powers delegated by the central government authorities (See: Leitan, 1979 & Yusoff et al., 2015b). The 
District Secretariat and all the officers working there are under the full control of the central government or the relevant 
line ministries. The nature and extent of decentralized administrative powers delegated to the District Secretariat is a very 
weak form - referred to as de-concentration - in decentralization literatures. Therefore, a district is not a politically-
empowered institution in Sri Lanka. There are also provinces and local government bodies which are empowered with 
decentralized political powers and authorities. To be clear, the demand advocated by the people of the coastal belt of the 
Amparai district is merely for an administrative unit (district) which enjoys decentralized administrative powers. The only 
similarity between the demand for the proposed administrative district and a Muslim-majority political autonomous unit is 
that the territory in question is probably the same. The demand for a Muslim autonomous unit has always been strongly 
opposed by many Sinhala nationalists forces whenever it was put forward at the political negotiation table (See: Sarjoon, 
2011 & Yusoff et al., 2014). With that background, the supporters of these nationalist forces view this proposed 
administrative district as the initial step to form a Muslim-majority autonomous unit or a state. Further, they find the 
formation of an administrative district based on ethnic or racial lines as divisive, being a sure recipe for disaster. 
However, it has to be said that for rationalists, the difference between a state and a district should be obvious. 
The other reason given by the Sinhalese to justify their opposition to the Kalmunai district demand is their belief 
that the hidden objective of the Muslims in demanding for the new administrative district is to grab more governmental 
land including the protected jungles and archeological sites (most probably the Deegawaapi sacred area) and to issue 
more land permits to the Muslims (Pradeep, 2008). They question the Muslims’ claims of allocating more land according 
to the percentage of their ethnic composition. Further, they claim that the present day Amparai belongs to the ancient 
Anuradhapura Kingdom and later to Kandyan Kingdom, where the Muslims were settled only on the coastal belt of the 
district. According to them, the Sinhalese who inhibited the Amparai and other parts of the eastern province after 1921 
were settled in parts of land that had belonged to the Kandyan Kingdom, not along the coastal strip on which King 
Senarat settled the Muslims facing the wrath of the Portuguese. Therefore, there is no basis for the Muslims’ claims that 
the Sinhalese government had seized their land for Sinhalese settlements and other economic purposes (Pradeep, 
2008). In line with this, a majority of the Sinhalese opponents view this district demand as a way for the Muslims to grab 
more government land in the district, under the control of the new District Secretariat. However, it is obvious that the 
proposed new district will only cover the inhabitant areas of coastal stretch where the Tamil-speakers predominantly 
lived, and there is no chance for the District Secretariat or the politicians living within the proposed district to grab any 
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land beyond the limits of the district boundary. Matters pertaining to land settlement and distribution are carried out by the 
respective authorities of the central line ministries, with the District Secretariats merely facilitating these functions, unless 
the central authorities and bureaucrats at District Secretariats made decisions favoring any particular ethnic group, as 
had happened in the Amparai district earlier.  
Therefore, it is found that the criticisms posed by the Sinhalese public and nationalistic forces are hardly 
judgmental and are mainly expressed in order to oppose any initiative for decentralization and power-sharing with the 
ethnic minorities. The history of opposition politics reveals that the Sinhalese failed to identify the rationale behind the 
minorities’ demands for power-sharing and decentralization, including the Kalmunai district demand. However, a small 
group of people, mostly academics and leftists, support the new district demand to a certain extent, viewing it to be in line 
with public service delivery, regional development, good governance, and the accommodation of minority rights. 
However, given that hegemonic ethno-nationalism has re-emerged and dominated the whole sphere of public life in Sri 
Lanka, the rationalist views and expressions have always been undermined.   
 
4.1.2 Opposition and Criticisms from the Tamils 
 
The demand for Kalmunai administrative district has also received strong criticisms from the Tamil community, hence 
undermining it further. Initially, both the Muslims and the Tamils of the region had jointly advocated the proposed 
administrative district as it would help to resolve linguistic and other issues faced by both ethnic groups. The cohesive 
politics of both ethnic groups had strengthened the advocacy of the demand to a certain extent. Many Muslim politicians 
in this region succeeded in their political career through coalition with the major Tamil political party, the Federal Party 
(FP). Initially, not only the Tamil public but the Tamil politicians too supported the Kalmunai administrative district 
demand as it would benefit the two communities. However, in time, especially after the intense and violent ethnic conflict 
and civil war, the ethnic relations between the Muslims and the Tamils in the north-eastern provinces deteriorated and 
both ethnic groups became politically separated. The Tamils’ nationalist struggle showed its interest in the Tamils only, 
and even targeted the innocent Muslims in the north-eastern region, forgetting the fact that they share with the Muslims 
the Tamil language as a feature of their ethnicity. The Muslims were also ethnically mobilized through a distinct Muslim 
political party which advocated the rights and interests of the Muslim community, especially those living in the north-
eastern region. Thereafter, the divisions and conflicts between the Tamils and the Muslims increased in the north-eastern 
region, including in the Amparai district.  
The establishment of a Muslim political party, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), under the leadership of 
MHM.Ashraff intensified the advocacy of the Kalmunai administrative district together with the demand for a Muslim-
majority political autonomous unit for the sake of the Muslim community living in the north-eastern region. This Muslims’ 
autonomy claim was viewed by the Tamils as opposed to their ethnic politics and their advocacy for a separate state in 
the north-eastern region. Therefore, they opposed both the Muslims’ demand for Kalmunai administrative district and the 
Muslim-majority politically autonomous unit. When the SLMC leaders seriously advocated the Kalmunai administrative 
district demand in 2000, the Tamils in the Amparai district protested and appealed to the government authorities and 
President to stop the initiative. It was noticed from the field survey that a number of the Tamil public and local politicians 
expressed their resistance on the matter, although a few were able to appreciate the rationale for the establishment of 
the proposed administrative district.  
This study has identified a number of factors which have induced the oppositions by the Tamils towards the 
Kalmunai administrative district demand. Many local Tamils feel that since SLMC has been advocating the proposed 
district as a Muslim-majority district, this would only benefit the Muslim community and lead to the Tamils being 
marginalized under administration of the new district. To a certain extent, this argument or feeling is understandable, as 
many SLMC leaders had made mistakes in this regard. As pointed out by many Tamils and other critics of the demand, 
up till now, the SLMC leaders have not sought to engage in any discussion or negotiation with the Tamil politicians and 
the civil forces regarding the importance of establishing the proposed district and the benefits which it will bring to both 
communities. Yet, they are appealing for support from the Tamil political parties and the public. Notwithstanding, the 
Tamils’ argument that the establishment of the proposed district would benefit only the Muslims and lead to the 
marginalization of the Tamils cannot be easily justifiable. It is obvious that the Muslims would form the majority in the 
proposed Kalmunai district’s population as presently the Sinhalese live in 17 districts, the Tamils in 6 districts and the 
Muslims in 2 districts. But, as Noorul Haqu (Personal communication, 3 August, 2014) argued, there is no historical 
record showing that the Muslims have dominated the administration of any district in Sri Lanka, even though they form a 
majority of the population in two districts, namely in Amparai and Trincomalee. Further, according to Noorul Haqu (Ibid), 
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the Muslims will not try to dominate the administration of the proposed district because doing so would impact the 
Muslims living as minority communities in other districts. Therefore, if the organization of the proposed district’s 
administration is clearly designed, taking into considering ethnic sensitivities in sharing power, positions, and resources, 
the possibility of ethnic domination by the Muslims would be minimal.  
Regardless, the Tamils must accept the fact that the establishment of the proposed district would definitely resolve 
the linguistic issues facing by members of both ethnic groups, namely the Tamils and the Muslims. It was observed 
through the field survey that many Tamils agree that the proposed district would allow them to fulfill their needs in their 
own native language. It was noted that many Tamils also acknowledged that under the present district administration—at 
the District Secretariat—they also face difficulties due to the domination by the Sinhalese and the Sinhala language. 
Therefore, the Tamils’ opposition to the proposed district is not entirely reasonable. 
Another factor that motivated the Tamils to oppose the proposed Kalmunai district is the lack of political support 
rendered by the Muslim public and politicians towards the Tamils’ political struggles and initiatives and their demands to 
fight for the rights and interests of the Tamils as well as to resolve the administrative issues facing by them. An example 
of this would be the demands calling for the establishment of a full-fledged Divisional Secretariat (DS) in Kalmunai (Tamil 
division) and Grama Niladari (GN) divisions in many Muslim-majority areas on the coastal belt of Amparai and other 
districts (IN.10-12, Personal communications, 13 September, 2014). Some aspects of the above argument are true to a 
certain extent. It is obvious that the Muslim leaders, especially the SLMC leaders, have not openly supported or publicly 
advocated the upgrading of the Kalmunai Tamil DS division into a full-fledged one, despite this being a long-term 
demand posed by the Tamils in the Kalmunai area. On the other hand, the Tamils cannot fully deny the support extended 
by the Muslims for their nationalist movement and struggles. From the beginning of the Tamils’ political struggle for rights 
and recognition, the Muslims have allied with them as fellow Tamil-speaking people. The famous Muslim leaders, 
including the founder of the SLMC, the first successful distinct Muslim political party in Sri Lanka, have also accepted the 
concept of self-determination of the Tamils and their struggle for a separate state. (See: Sarjoon 2001 & Yusoff et al., 
2014). Unfortunately, when the Tamils turned their political struggle into a violent one, they targeted the Muslims, failing 
to consider them as fellow Tamil-speakers and disregarding their contribution to the Tamils’ nationalist struggles.  
The Muslims in the north-eastern region were compelled to mobilize politically and to form a political party based 
on their own ethnic line. They separately advocated their own rights and interests as a reaction to ethnic and political 
marginalization by the Tamils (and the Sinhalese). When Tamil militant groups began to violently target the lives and 
livelihood of innocent Muslims in the districts of the north-east, the Muslims’ political mobilization and their advocacy for 
Muslim-oriented demands were also strengthened. However, it is worth highlighting that in the process of political 
mobilization, the Muslims never attempted to undermine the Tamils’ struggles and their nationalist movement. The 
Muslim leaders chose non-violent means to voice out their rights and to save their community through political and 
administrative institutional arrangements. Hence, the demands for a Muslim-majority autonomous unit and a Muslim-
majority administrative district emerged. It is ironic that the Tamils have also been experiencing administrative grievances 
at district and divisional levels in the Amparai district. It is obvious that Muslim politicians have not extended their support 
to resolve Tamils’ grievances, including the upgrading of the Kalmunai Tamil DS division into a full-fledged DS division. 
However, being opposed to the establishment of the proposed Kalmunai district would not resolve these problems. 
Leaders of both ethnic groups must unite and co-operate in this regard; cohesive politics would strengthen the ethnic and 
socio-economic relationships of both ethnic groups living in this region as well as empower their political advocacy, for 
the sake of their community rights and interests. 
 
4.2 The Criticisms and Opposition Expressed by the Major Political Parties towards the Kalmunai Administrative 
District Demand 
 
This study has found that the communalized criticisms and oppositions expressed by major political parties within and 
outside parliament has caused difficulties in the achievement of the Kalmunai administrative district demand to a certain 
extent. Political parties are the gatekeepers who turn public issues into “demands” and push them forward as “input” to 
the political system. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the political parties functioning on principles of democracy to 
consider the impact of such issues in society and bring them into the political system in order to find solutions. As a 
political party representing the Muslim community in particular, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) has been calling 
for the establishment of the proposed Kalmunai administrative district within and the outside parliament for the last 30 
years. But, as is usual in Sri Lankan political culture, no party has shown its strong support for the demand both within 
and outside the parliament. Whenever, the Kalmunai district demand was put forward in parliament and emphasized at 
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societal level, the demand was met with immediate criticisms and oppositions from major political parties representing 
both Sinhalese and Tamils. In contrast, whenever the SLMC’s support was crucial for those parties to sustain their 
political power, they would always be silent. Even though the fulfillment of the demand, i.e., the establishment of the 
proposed district, would be beneficial for the Tamils living in the proposed district, no Tamil party has expressed its 
strong support for the demand either within or outside parliament. In the post-war context, the demand received strong 
criticisms and oppositions from almost all major political parties in Sri Lanka. The following sub-sections review the trend, 
nature, and extent of the censures and oppositions expressed by the major political parties throughout history with 
regards to the Kalmunai administrative district demand.  
 
4.2.1 The Stance of the United National Party (UNP) 
 
The UNP is one of the two major national level political parties which has ruled the country for nearly half of the post-
independence era. Since its establishment, it has been following the path of liberal democracy, and a majority of Sri 
Lankan Muslims have also been supporting it. When the Muslim organizations and parties initially put forward the 
Kalmunai administrative district demand in the beginning of 1980s, there was no consensus among the UNP leaders to 
accept and fulfill the demand even though the UNP was in power, with three Muslim parliamentarians representing the 
party from the coastal area of Amparai district. At the time, the UNP-led government had shown its interest to explore the 
demand, but this was opposed by some Sinhalese parliamentarians from the UNP, especially those representing the 
Amparai district. Therefore, the initiative was abandoned by the government (IN.02, Ibid & Noorul Haqu, 2002:19). At the 
time, the UNP government had secured five-sixth majority in parliament and had made a number of constitutional 
amendments, including one which established the Kilinochchi administrative district in 1984 even though this was not 
strongly demanded or advocated by the people of northern Tamils as compared with the Muslims’ demand in the coastal 
belt of Amparai. In the later part of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, the UNP government under President Premadasa 
intended to fulfill the demand, but due to high pressure and opposition from the Sinhalese and Muslim parliamentarians 
representing the Amparai district, the government abandoned such initiatives (IN.02, Ibid & IN.13, Personal 
communication, 9 August, 2014). On the other hand, since the beginning of the 1990s, the successive governments 
formed by the UNP or SLFP focused on the military defeat of minorities’ demands and claims for power-sharing and 
autonomy, therefore there was no room for Muslims to convince the leaders to establish the proposed Kalmunai district.  
 A slight change was seen in UNP’s stance towards the demands of minorities from the beginning of 2000. When 
the UNP formed the government with the support of the SLMC after the December 2001 general elections, the UNP 
leaders were compelled to consider the SLMC’s demands for the establishment of the Kalmunai administrative district. 
The UNP-led government made initiatives to establish the proposed Kalmunai administrative district. Unfortunately, due 
to lack of unity and consensus among the Muslim leaders, i.e., between the SLMC leaders and the leaders of the 
National Congress, a party emerged from the split within SLMC on the matter of naming the proposed district and placing 
its secretariat, the government had easily abandoned those initiatives (Skynetbit.com, 2005). Additionally, the UNP had 
accepted the Kalmunai district demand as part of its 2005 Presidential election manifesto, to be fulfilled if its candidate 
was elected to the Presidency. This was unsuccessful since the UNP candidate lost the election. However, as Hasan Ali 
(Personal communication, 8 August, 2014) revealed, there was a mutual understanding between the SLMC and the UNP 
on the matter of Kalmunai administrative district which led to the electoral coalition between the SLMC and the UNP in 
the eastern provincial council election and the general election held in 2008 and 2010 respectively.  
When the SLMC leaders once again came to insist on the establishment of the Kalmunai administrative district in 
the later part of 2014, some UNP MPs resisted and seriously criticized this on communal lines at parliament, which was 
not opposed by the first level leaders of the party. In responding to the SLMC’s demand, the UNP MP, Vijadasa 
Rajapacksha commented that “it is a silly argument to say that they need to carve out a separate administration district 
claiming that the administration is done in Sinhala” (Indrajith, 2014). He further associated the Kalmunai administrative 
district demand to be equal to the LTTE demand for a separate state (See: Parliament Secretariat, 2014). His criticisms 
received much support from other parties and also induced them to further communalize the demand. However, the UNP 
national leader and other leaders did not oppose or comment on Vijedasa’s speech and criticisms in this regard.  
It is worth noting that the UNP, the first party introduced the decentralization initiatives at district level in Sri Lanka 
to reconcile ethnic grievances and boost economic and regional development, has continuously failed to positively 
consider the Kalmunai district demand. As many advocates of the demand reveal, the fulfillment of the demand would 
resolve the linguistic issues facing by the Tamil-speakers and support the regional development to a certain extent. 
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4.2.2 The Stance taken by the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United People Freedom Alliance (UPFA) 
 
Aside from the UNP, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) is the other party which has nation-wide reputation, political 
support, and representation in Sri Lanka. Similar to the UNP, the SLFP has also ruled the country for half of the post-
independent era. As a socialist party, it received support from the lower and middle segment of society and worked for 
the empowerment of the rural public. However, the Muslims’ support for the SLFP was minimal until the SLMC formed a 
coalition with the SLFP-led People’s Alliance (PA) government in August 1994 (Aliff and Sarjoon, 2010 & Imtiyas, 2012). 
The SLMC leader, Ashraff, as a king-maker in the PA government, was very much influential within the cabinet and was 
able to put forward the party’s long-term demand for a Muslim-majority autonomous unit in the merged north-eastern 
province. He was able to convince the coalition parties to incorporate this demand in the negotiation settlement process. 
However, there were strong criticisms for the SLMC’s demand within the government. At the last stage of the PA 
government, the SLMC leader urged the government to establish the proposed Kalmunai district as the first step towards 
resolving the administrative issues facing by the Tamil-speaking people in that area. However, the government delayed 
this process and this ultimately led the SLMC to break up its relations with the SLFP-led coalition government just few 
days before the October 2000 general election.  
 During the 2000 general election, the SLMC requested a mandate from the people of Amparai coastal area to 
push the new government to establish the proposed Kalmunai district. However, the general election once again 
produced a hang-parliament with no major party receiving a majority to form a government. The election once again 
produced government-making power to the SLMC. Since the SLMC won 4 seats in the Amparai district with 
overwhelming support from the Muslims in the coastal belt, it bargained for the formation of the Kalmunai district matter 
with the PA in order to form the coalition government. At last, SLMC formed an alliance with the SLFP-led PA, while 
agreeing on a number of important demands, including that for the establishment of the proposed Kalmunai district within 
100 days. In the beginning, the SLFP-led government had tentatively agreed to the establishment of the proposed district 
and had made some arrangements towards this, including the preparation of the necessary papers for a one-man 
commission to look into the matter and report to the minister in charged (Sathyapalan, 2001). However, the stiff 
resistance which existed within the SLFP and coalition parties in the cabinet eventually led to the rupture of the SLFP-
SLMC coalition and compelled the SLMC to withdraw its support for the government within one year. This later caused 
the SLFP-led PA to lose its ruling power.  
The SLFP came into power again in 2004 when it won the general election under the United People Freedom 
Alliance (UPFA), a formation of alliance with many leftist parties. Later, many Sinhalese nationalist parties also supported 
the government. Since more fragmentation occurred within the SLMC, with more nationalist and anti-Muslim forces 
gathering within the SLFP-led government, SLFP leaders easily neglected the SLMC’s demand for Kalmunai 
administrative district despite the SLMC representatives extended their support for the UPFA government. Later, from 
2010 onwards, SLFP leaders further gave promises and made agreements with the SLMC while adopting the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the constitution (adopted in September 2010) and forming the eastern provincial council in September 
2012 (Hasan Ali, Ibid & Parliament Secretariat, 2014). However, until SLFP was in power (up to January 2015 
presidential election), the SLFP or SLFP-led UPFA leaders failed to honor the agreements reached with the SLMC 
regarding the Kalmunai administrative district matter, and they failed to form the proposed district.  
It is worth noting that whenever the SLMC supported important policy decisions and acts, including the 
constitutional amendment favoring the SLFP-led UPFA government and its leaders, there were no criticisms towards the 
SLMC’s demand for the Kalmunai administrative district. On many occasions when the both SLMC and SLFP leaders 
agreed to consider and establish the proposed district, none of the coalition partners or the leaders of the SLFP or SLFP-
led UPFA opposed or voiced out against the demand. Yet, when the SLMC repeated its demand just before it decided to 
leave the UPFA government in December 2014, many SLFP leaders and leaders of the coalition parties harshly criticized 
and expressed their oppositions towards the demand on negative communal lines. The SLFP’s senior member and the 
Prime Minister of the SLFP-led UPFA government, DM.Jeyarathe, strongly supported the argument made by the UNP 
MP, Wijedasa Rajapcksa, in opposing the SLMC’s demand for Kalmunai administrative district in parliament (See: 
Parliament Secretariat, 2014 & Tamil Guardian, 2014). When the SLMC left the SLFP-led UPFA coalition government 
and extended its support to the opposition Presidential candidate, the SLFP secretary general, Anura Priyadarshana 
Yapa reported that “the SLMC attempts to realize one more goal in the international conspiracy to make Sri Lanka an 
unstable country. Establishing a separate administrative district for Muslims can cause damage to peace and unity in the 
motherland. The SLMC’s demand is extremely similar to the LTTE demand for Eelam. SLMCers are trying to push 
separatism in Sri Lanka and create an unstable situation that would harm peace, harmony, reconciliation, social and 
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economic development” (Dissanayake, 2014). 
In fact, the Muslim community strongly opposed the support extended by the SLMC representatives to the SLFP-
led UPFA government on many important and controversial policy decisions taken both during and after the civil war. The 
Muslim community in general and the north-eastern Muslims in particular bore a number of grievances regarding having 
their ethnicity recognized and practicing their religion. Their physical entities also became the target of severe violence in 
many parts of the country (See: Farook, 2014; Senaratne, 2014 & Yusoff and Sarjoon, 2016). All these incidents 
significantly pressured SLMC leaders to withdraw their support for the SLFP-led government. However, the SLMC 
leaders continued to stay with the government, expecting their demands, including their demand for the Kalmunai 
administrative district, to be fulfilled. In the end, the SLFP not only broke the promises they made to the SLMC on the 
Kalmunai administrative district demand, but also opposed and criticized it with brutal and harsh words.  
Apart from the above two major political parties, a number of other parties representing the Sinhalese and other 
nationalist forces have also criticized and expressed their resistance towards the Kalmunai administrative district demand 
on many occasions. Most of them shared the same opinion regarding this demand whenever they aligned with the two 
major political parties. It is interesting to note that whenever the major parties accepted the demand, most of the coalition 
parties fell silent and whenever the major parties opposed it, these coalition parties echoed their opposition and 
criticisms. There was no firm stance on this Kalmunai administrative district matter among any political party in general.  
 
4.2.3 The Stance taken by Major Tamil Political Parties   
 
Although the Tamils and the Muslims living in the north-eastern region have been proudly stating that they have a long 
history of mutual understanding and co-operation in all aspects of life including in politics, in reality many differences 
emerged between the two groups following the intensity of the ethnic conflict. It is true that both ethnic groups enjoyed a 
cohesive politics and mutually advocated for the rights (including the rights of self-determination and self-rule) of both 
groups under the slogan of “Tamil-speakers.” When the Muslims supported the major Tamil political party, the Federal 
Party (FP—later Tamils United Liberation Front—TULF) in the 1950s and 1960s, leaders of the FP, as a policy, accepted 
the necessity of establishing a Muslim-majority federal unit in the eastern province in order to accommodate the Muslims’ 
rights and interests for political autonomy within the federal form of government. When Celvanayagam, the leader of the 
FP, made an agreement with SWRD Bandaranayake, the then Prime Minister of Sri Lanka in 1957, he incorporated a 
provision to form more federal units in the eastern province to accommodate other ethnic groups aside from the Tamils, 
and especially to respect the self-rule of Muslims (See: Ghose, 2003; Sarjoon, 2011 & Yusoff et al., 2014). Similarly, the 
Muslim leaders had also accepted the resolution passed by the TULF leaders for the establishment of a separate state 
for the Tamils in the north-eastern region in 1976. During the 1977 general election, many Muslim leaders, including 
MHM.Ashraff, advocated the concept of a separate state for the Tamils and worked towards achieving it. However, when 
the Tamils’ non-violent political advocacy failed, it transformed into a violent movement controlled by the Tamil militant 
groups after the 1977 general election, which only advocated the rights and interests of the Tamils alone. This in turn 
prompted the Muslims to search for their own political institution in order to safeguard their existence, identity, and rights 
within the region. With the emergence of a separate Muslim political party, the SLMC, in the mid-1980s, ethnic relations 
between the two groups further deteriorated and the two groups became political opponents. All Tamil rebel groups 
opposed and undermined the establishment of a Muslim political party and its political demands including the demand for 
autonomy and decentralized powers for Muslims. Since all major Tamil parties were under the control of the militant 
groups who resorted to violent means to achieve their aims, no political party or forces representing Tamils had openly 
expressed their support for the causes and the demands of the Muslims, including the proposed Kalmunai administrative 
district demand.  
 As stated earlier, the demand for the establishment of the Kalmunai administrative district was initially 
conceptualized and advocated by both Tamil and Muslim political leaders who worked together with mutual trust. 
However, the civil war led to the break-up of ethnic relations between the Tamils and the Muslims. Tamil politicians 
continued to oppose many of the Muslim demands, including the demand for the proposed Kalmunai administrative 
district. Despite this, the SLMC’s founder leader, MHM.Ashrff, maintained cordial relations with the major political leaders 
of the Tamil community, especially with the leaders of the TULF. On the other hand, no record is available evidencing 
support from any Tamil political party or leader for the SLMC’s demand for the proposed administrative district. To date, 
no political party has openly expressed its strong opposition towards the proposed district either. However, in the recent 
past, whenever the Sinhalese politicians and nationalist forces criticized and openly opposed the demand, some Tamil 
politicians and political forces at local level had also expressed their negative viewpoints on the same. Further, they 
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questioned the sincerity of the Muslim political parties in supporting the advocacy of the rights of the Tamils.  
During the field survey for this study, the criticisms and opposition expressed by some local level political leaders 
and representatives of Tamil parties concerning the subjects of the Kalmunai administrative district demand were noted.  
Though a majority of them accepted that the establishment of the proposed district would facilitate them in fulfilling their 
administrative tasks in their own language and would support the development of their socio-economic conditions, their 
main concern was that the Tamils would be marginalized and their interests would be neglected under the administration 
of the proposed district dominated by the Muslims (IN.11 & IN.12, Ibid). A majority of the interviewees who participated in 
the field survey also acknowledged the lack of political understanding between the Tamil-Muslim political parties and 
leaders as being one of the major factors challenging the feasibility of the fulfillment of the Kalmunai administrative 
district demand. Even though the TNA and the SLMC and their leaders have been publicizing the fact that both ethnic 
groups and their political parties must unite and work together for their mutual betterment, to date no meaningful initiative 
has been taken towards this, including towards the establishment of the proposed district. Since both ethnic groups have 
been facing similar issues in terms of district administration in Amparai, the collaborative efforts by political parties and 
leaders of both ethnic groups would strengthen the advocacy of the demand and influence the policy-makers and political 
authorities to consider the demand positively. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
In the aftermath of civil war, Sri Lanka’s politics became highly communalized. Many minority demands, despite being 
based on rational grounds, were viewed through ethnic lenses and were thus strongly criticized and opposed by ethnic 
majorities and the political parties representing them. The Kalmunai administrative district demand, which was once 
popularly advocated by the Tamil-speaking Muslims and Tamils living in the coastal belt of the present Amparai district in 
1960s, suffered the same fate. Both ethnic groups faced similar administrative problems such as violation of their right to 
access public services in their own language (in Tamil), the domination of Sinhala language in district administration, the 
location of the District Secretariat, ethnic marginalization and the domination of the Sinhalese in district administration 
and resource utilization. Due to this, both ethnic groups and their leaders collectively voiced out these administrative 
grievances and advocated the demand calling for the establishment of a separate administrative district (Kalmunai) for 
their predominant area. However, following the intense civil war, this administrative district demand became mostly 
favored by the Muslims alone, who form majority in the proposed district, and came to be opposed by the other ethnic 
groups and their leaders.  
As set out in this paper, there are rationales behind the Kalmunai administrative district demand. To a certain 
extent, the establishment of the proposed district would help to resolve the administrative grievances of those living 
within the proposed district and would potentially bring other positive effects such as the improvement of public service 
delivery, enhancement of socio-economic conditions and regional development, and strengthening of ethnic cohesion in 
the region. However, both the Sinhalese and the Tamils (and their political parties) continued to view the demand on 
ethnic lines and failed to acknowledge the grievances that the Muslims face in terms of district administration. The 
arguments expressed by the opponents to the Kalmunai district demand are somehow ethnic-oriented and cannot be 
easily justifiable. Despite criticisms by the Tamil leaders and public, it was obvious that the establishment of the proposed 
Kalmunai district will not empower the Muslims alone, but also the Tamils.  
It is worth pointing out that major political parties have chosen to communalize the Kalmunai administrative district 
demand differently in different contexts. Almost all major political parties, in different political and electoral contexts, have 
at one time or another accepted the Kalmunai district demand and agreed or promised to form the proposed district. Yet, 
contrary to these promises, they later criticized and opposed the demand on communal lines. In Sri Lankan context, an 
administrative district functions as an intermediate institution facilitating the delivery of a number of public services 
offered by the central ministries and departments at local level. Therefore, it is obvious that the District Secretariats 
merely exercise a form of decentralized power—known as de-concentration. Yet, the Kalmunai district demand was still 
strongly resisted by the ethnic majorities—the Tamils and the Sinhalese—and by the major political parties, where they 
viewed the demand as calling for more political autonomy and a separate state for Muslims in the region. This clearly 
indicates that the criticisms and oppositions expressed towards the Kalmunai administrative districts demand are largely 
irrational and adopted on communal basis. This study also found that the major political party advocating the Kalmunai 
administrative district demand—the SLMC—has also highly ethicized the demand and sought to justify it on the basis of 
ethnicity. Finally, this study suggests that conceptualizing and advocating the proposed administrative district on rationale 
grounds would potentially make the demand successful.   
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